Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/168097 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Industrial Organisation No. A13-V2
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
I study consumer switching costs’ effect on firms’ price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial design experiment with and without communication. For Bertrand duopolies the price level under consumer switching costs is lower vis-à-vis new consumers but not affected towards old consumers. Markets are overall less tacitly collusive which translates into higher incentives to collude explicitly. The results have antitrust implications especially for the focus of cartel screening.
JEL: 
C7
C9
L13
L41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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