Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/168072 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Health Economics I No. A03-V3
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
Experiments show that prioritizing registered donors on the waiting list impressively increases the willingness to register as an organ donor. We are the first to provide a comparative-statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods a registered person can skip on the waiting list. Our results indicate that a higher number of bonus periods significantly improves registration rates whereas a small bonus of only one period is of minor significance.
JEL: 
I10
I18
C90
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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