Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168068
Authors: 
Puppe, Clemens
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Mechanism Design C09-V3
Abstract: 
It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders.This result has a number of corollaries, among other things it implies that a single-crossing (‘order-restricted’) domain can be minimally rich only if it is a subdomain of a single-peaked domain.
JEL: 
D71
C72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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