Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168057
Authors: 
Kurschilgen, Michael
Morell, Alexander
Weisel, Ori
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games I A02-V1
Abstract: 
We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-à-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets.
JEL: 
D43
L22
C92
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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