Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168022
Authors: 
Götz, Martin R.
Tröger, Tobias H.
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
White Paper Series 47
Abstract: 
Bank regulators have the discretion to discipline banks by executing enforcement actions to ensure that banks correct deficiencies regarding safe and sound banking principles. We highlight the trade-offs regarding the execution of enforcement actions for financial stability. Following this we provide an overview of the differences in the legal framework governing supervisors' execution of enforcement actions in the Banking Union and the United States. After discussing work on the effect of enforcement action on bank behaviour and the real economy, we present data on the evolution of enforcement actions and monetary penalties by U.S. regulators. We conclude by noting the importance of supervisors to levy efficient monetary penalties and stressing that a division of competences among different regulators should not lead to a loss of efficiency regarding the execution of enforcement actions.
Subjects: 
financial stability
banking supervision
banking regulation
bank sanctions
monetary penalties
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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