Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167999 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
Subjects: 
community-based reasoning
epistemic logic
game theory
rule-following
counterfactuals
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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