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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-19
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other's valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the 'best informed player' would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion.
Schlagwörter: 
possibilistic beliefs
unrestricted combinatorial auctions
mutual belief of rationality
incomplete information
extensive-form games
distinguishable dominance
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