Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167980 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-23
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Effective sharing mechanisms of joint costs among beneficiaries of a project are a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the project. Projects that are heterogeneous both in terms of the landscape of the area under development or the participants (users) lead to a more complicated set of allocation mechanisms than homogeneous projects. The analysis presented in this paper uses cooperative game theory to develop schemes for sharing costs and revenues from a project involving various beneficiaries in an equitable and fair way. The proposed approach is applied to theWest Delta irrigation project. It sketches a differential two-part tariff that reproduces the allocation of total project costs using the Shapley Value, a well-known cooperative game allocation solution. The proposed differential tariff, applied to each land section in the project reflecting their landscape-related costs, contrasts the unified tariff that was proposed using the traditional methods in the project planning documents.
Subjects: 
water project
cost allocation
cooperative game
Shapley Value
sustainability
stability
Egypt
West Delta
JEL: 
Q15
Q58
H43
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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