Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167975
Authors: 
Cardona, Daniel
Rubí-Barceló, Antoni
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 1-17
Abstract: 
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.
Subjects: 
multilateral bargaining
one-dimensional
multiple equilibria
time preference
JEL: 
C78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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