Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167952
Authors: 
Cox, Caleb A.
Stoddard, Brock
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 394-412
Abstract: 
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.
Subjects: 
public goods
experiment
framing
cooperation
JEL: 
C72
C73
C92
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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