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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 381-393
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men's choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives.
Schlagwörter: 
public good game
lab experiment
group representative
gender
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