Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167935
Authors: 
Ethier, Stewart N.
Lee, Jiyeon
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 57-78
Abstract: 
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by 0 E 2 (0; 1). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this solution exists only for certain 0. A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a "with replacement" assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all 0.
Subjects: 
baccara banque
baccara à deux tableaux
three-person game
sampling with replacement
Nash equilibrium
independent cooperative equilibrium
correlated cooperative equilibrium
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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