Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167846 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Risks [ISSN:] 2227-9091 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 61-76
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Publicly provided long-term care (LTC) insurance with means-tested benefits is suspected to crowd out either private saving or informal care. This contribution predicts crowding-out effects for both private saving and informal care for policy measures designed to relieve the public purse from LTC expenditure such as more stringent means testing and increased taxation of inheritance. These effects result from the interaction of a parent who decides on the amount of saving in retirement and a caregiver who decides on the effort devoted to informal care which lowers the probability of admission to a nursing home. Double crowding-out effects are also found to be the consequence of exogenous influences, notably a higher opportunity cost of caregiving.
Subjects: 
long-term care
crowding out
informal care
saving
means testing
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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