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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economies [ISSN:] 2227-7099 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 2-36
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
Schlagwörter: 
open list
closed list
proportional representation
single nontransferable vote
voting equilibria
JEL: 
D27
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