Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/167685 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
FAU Discussion Papers in Economics No. 15/2017
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics, Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find differences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers.
Schlagwörter: 
Ultimatum Game
Waiting Time
Experimental Currency
Leaving the Laboratory
Framing
JEL: 
C91
C70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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