Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167685
Authors: 
Doll, Monika
Seebauer, Michael
Tonn, Maren
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 15/2017
Abstract: 
We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find differences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers.
Subjects: 
Ultimatum Game
Waiting Time
Experimental Currency
Leaving the Laboratory
Framing
JEL: 
C91
C70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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