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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6561
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
I investigate the interaction between a country that imports a commodity whose production contributes to a stock pollution, such as electricity, from a country that produces that commodity. If the transboundary externality is priced improperly, the application of a feed-in tariff or border tax adjustment can provide an indirect policy instrument. But the imposition of such a tariff or tax creates an incentive for the producing country to deploy some sort of pollution controlling instrument. This, in turn, creates a strategic interaction between the two countries. Because the externality is inked to a stock pollutant, this strategic interaction will play out over time, which induces a dynamic game. In this modeling context, I describe the nature of the strategic interaction, and characterize the Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
transboundary pollution
differential game
tariff
tax
JEL: 
C73
Q54
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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