Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167545
Authors: 
Barach, Moshe A.
Horton, John
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6559
Abstract: 
We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants, and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 7% lower past average wages and hired workers with 16% lower past average wages. Conditional upon bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves. Using a structural model of bidding and hiring, we find that the selection effects we observe would also occur in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
field experiments
compensation
search and screening
JEL: 
J01
J30
M50
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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