Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167525
Autoren: 
Federico, Giulio
Langus, Gregor
Valletti, Tommaso M.
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6539
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that the merging parties always decrease their innovation efforts post-merger while the outsiders to the merger respond by increasing their effort. A merger tends to reduce overall innovation. Consumers are always worse off after a merger. Our model calls into question the applicability of the “inverted-U” relationship between innovation and competition to a merger setting.
Schlagwörter: 
innovation
R&D
mergers
JEL: 
D43
G34
L40
O30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
405.27 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.