Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167510
Authors: 
Quaas, Martin F.
Winkler, Ralph
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6524
Abstract: 
Sustainability and efficiency are potentially conflicting social objectives in natural resource management. We propose a market mechanism to allocate use rights over a stochastic resource to private managers. The mechanism endogenously determines the maximal tenure length guaranteeing that the sustainability goal is obeyed for sure over the entire period. In addition, the mechanism achieves efficiency, i.e. it maximizes the expected present value of resource rents that accrue to society. Potential applications include improved fishing agreements between developing countries and distant-water fishing fleets.
Subjects: 
auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficient resource allocation
renewable resources
stochastic resource dynamics
sustainability
JEL: 
Q20
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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