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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6519
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled and of being willing to live off others. Using a placebo treatment we can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a reduction in the take-up rate of 30 percentage points.
Schlagwörter: 
stigma
signaling
redistribution
non take-up
welfare program
JEL: 
D03
H31
I38
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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