Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167505
Authors: 
Friedrichsen, Jana
König, Tobias
Schmacker, Renke
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6519
Abstract: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled and of being willing to live off others. Using a placebo treatment we can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a reduction in the take-up rate of 30 percentage points.
Subjects: 
stigma
signaling
redistribution
non take-up
welfare program
JEL: 
D03
H31
I38
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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