Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167370
Authors: 
Riem, Marina
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 73
Abstract: 
This dissertation consists of six self-contained chapters that are related to the behavior of firms and politicians in a broader sense. After an introduction to the topic, the first part of the dissertation elaborates on how institutional and political framework conditions influence the behavior of firms. Chapter 2 examines the determinants of inter vivos transfers of ownership in German family firms. Survey evidence indicates that owners of larger firms, and firms with strong current business conditions, transfer ownership at higher rates than others. Chapter 3 investigates how political uncertainty influences corporate investment decisions employing data on firms' self-reported investment realizations, plans and revisions. The results show that realized investment ratios decreased in years when state elections occurred relative to the average investment ratio in years with no state election. Firms however seem to anticipate electoral uncertainty already when making investment plans and hardly revise their plans. Chapter 4 examines whether political uncertainty influences how firm owners perceive their present state and future development of business. The results show that firm owners expect their business to develop better before state elections and worse after state elections. The second part of this dissertation investigates how partisanship and self-interest of politicians shape their ethos and behavior. Chapter 5 describes how partisanship shapes the attitudes and actions of politicians in Germany. The results show that German state politicians’ and governments’ words differed from actions regarding budget consolidation and the German debt brake. Chapter 6 examines whether parties punish politicians who vote against the party line in roll-call votes. The results do not show that parties account for the voting behavior by punishing politicians who have voted against the party line.
Subjects: 
Inter vivos transfers
transfer taxes
family firms
firm-level investment
user cost of capital
political uncertainty
elections
survey data
panel data
business perceptions
government ideology
public debt
debt brake
balanced-budget rule
constitution
expressive rhetoric
voting against the party line
adherence to the party line
roll-call votes
proportional representation
party lists
selectorate
decision making in committees
minority voting
policy preferences
Joint Economic Forecast of German economic research institutes.
JEL: 
C23
D22
D24
D31
D72
D81
D92
H24
H25
H32
H60
H70
H72
H73
I23
ISBN: 
978-3-95942-023-5
Document Type: 
Research Report

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