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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ARTNeT Working Paper Series No. 167
Verlag: 
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT), Bangkok
Zusammenfassung: 
Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine the types of lobbying strategies for trade policy influence and what drives firm choice for these strategies. Firms can lobby collectively in a group (Join Hands), lobby individually as a single firm (Walk Alone), or adopt a dual lobbying strategy that is a unique combination of collective and individual lobbying. The findings are a first for India, and suggest the following: First, Indian manufacturing firms join hands (lobby using a collective strategy) when targeting sector-wide outcomes in the nature of public goods; firms join hands while walking alone (dual strategy) when targeting product- specific outcomes. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying strategy is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher) such that firms increase their chances of trade policy influence. This suggests a strong competition effect (driving cooperation and individual lobbying) over any free-riding that drives firm strategy to lobby for trade policy influence in India. Finally, availability of resources and lobbying time are significant drivers for the type of strategy undertaken.
Schlagwörter: 
lobbying strategy
trade policy
India
JEL: 
F13
F14
F5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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