Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/165956 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 13/2016
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
By incorporating positional dynamics into a conflict model relevant to battlefields and politics, we show that the conditions that induce regime stability can also induce hard conflicts. We show that in contests with incumbent-challenger turnover, i) asymmetric power across groups and positions may magnify conflicts; ii) more severe conflicts can occur with lower turnover of incumbents; iii) power can be self-defeating, as cost advantages can reduce payoffs; and iv) double inequality across positions and groups can maximize the graveness of conflicts and the social waste of resources. The propositions in our paper are contrary to the standard implications of static conict models.
Schlagwörter: 
contests
political stability
incumbency advantage
conict and civil war
JEL: 
C73
D72
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
439.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.