Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/165956
Authors: 
Mehlum, Halvor
Moene, Karl Ove
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 13/2016
Abstract: 
By incorporating positional dynamics into a conflict model relevant to battlefields and politics, we show that the conditions that induce regime stability can also induce hard conflicts. We show that in contests with incumbent-challenger turnover, i) asymmetric power across groups and positions may magnify conflicts; ii) more severe conflicts can occur with lower turnover of incumbents; iii) power can be self-defeating, as cost advantages can reduce payoffs; and iv) double inequality across positions and groups can maximize the graveness of conflicts and the social waste of resources. The propositions in our paper are contrary to the standard implications of static conict models.
Subjects: 
contests
political stability
incumbency advantage
conict and civil war
JEL: 
C73
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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