Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163462
Authors: 
Hallett, Andrew Hughes
Jensen, Svend E Hougaard
Richter, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
SUERF Studies 2004/3
Abstract: 
This paper studies the incentives to join or enlarge a monetary union under alternative assumptions about the extent of market reform within the union and in candidate countries. Lack of labour mobility, wage/price flexibility or fiscal reform brings costs for both new entrants and in the existing union. Countries will only want to join a union where there has been sufficient reform, and where markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their new partners as well. Fiscal restrictions, or a lack of fiscal flexibility, will exaggerate this incentive mismatch and may delay the necessary reforms.
Subjects: 
EMU
Enlargement
Structural Flexibility
Fiscal Policy
JEL: 
F2
F15
F33
F42
ISBN: 
978-3-902109-22-4
Document Type: 
Research Report

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