Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163015
Authors: 
Barr, Abigail
Michailidou, Georgia
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2016-14
Abstract: 
We use a novel experiment to investigate whether people aim to coordinate when, to do so, they have to lie; and are more willing to lie when, in doing so, they are aiming to coordinate with a potential accomplice, i.e., another with whom coordination would be beneficial and who is facing the same individual and mutual incentives and the same moral dilemma. We find that people often aim to coordinate when they have to lie to do so and that having a potential accomplice increases willingness to lie even when that potential accomplice is a stranger and communication is not possible.
Subjects: 
complicity
lying
coordination
die rolling task
JEL: 
C90
C91
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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