Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163012
Authors: 
Lee-Penagos, Alejandro
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2016-11
Abstract: 
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to coordinate in such an environment. We find that such agents are able to coordinate, often in complex ways, even without an external signal. Furthermore, when a signal is present, Correlated Equilibrium are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms.
Subjects: 
Battle of the Sexes
Correlated Equilibrium
evolutionary game theory
learning algorithms
coordination games
adaptive agents
JEL: 
C63
C73
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.