Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/163010 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2016-09
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
principal-agent models
incentive theory
non-monetary incentives
goal setting
reference-dependent utility
laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C92
D23
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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