Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163009
Authors: 
Possajennikov, Alex
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2016-08
Abstract: 
In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests.
Subjects: 
semi-aggregative games
conjectural variations
evolutionary stability
public good games
contests
JEL: 
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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