Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163003
Authors: 
Montero, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2016-02
Abstract: 
We examine the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.´s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.
Subjects: 
legislative bargaining
weighted voting
proportional payoffs
JEL: 
C78
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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