Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162987 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2014/7
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version: April 2016
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In the dictator game, the recipient's opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. This paperreports two experimentswhich study how the timing of messages affects dictators' decisions (experiment 1) and which value recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on dictator giving is equally strong when the recipient can send a message before or after the dictator has decided. However, recipients in a second experiment reveal a strong preference for pre-decision messages: Their willingnessto pay for pre-decision messages is higher than for post-decision messages.
Schlagwörter: 
communication
altruism
inequality
dictator game
JEL: 
D63
D64
C91
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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