Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162972
Authors: 
Brunner, Christoph
Kauffeldt, T. Florian
Rau, Hannes
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series 629
Abstract: 
In many experiments, the Nash equilibrium concept seems not to predict well. One reason may be that players have non-selfish preferences over outcomes. As a consequence, even when they are told what the material payoffs of the game are, mutual knowledge of preferences may not be satisfied. We experimentally examine several 2x2 games and test whether revealing players' preferences leads to more equilibrium play. For that purpose, we elicit subjects' preferences over outcomes before the games are played. It turns out that subjects are significantly more likely to play an equilibrium strategy when other players' preferences are revealed. We discuss a noisy version of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and a model of strategic ambiguity to account for observed subject behavior.
Subjects: 
Behavioral Game Theory
Epistemic Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium
Games of Incomplete Information
JEL: 
C91
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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