Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162967 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 624
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. The more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests, the more grants the district receives. Using panel data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal grants to congressional districts between 1984 and 2010, we provide evidence that districts represented by loyal legislators receive greater amounts of discretionary spending. This effect holds only for legislators in the majority party, who may enjoy a legislative advantage. Districts represented by loyal legislators who face a greater conflict of interest between following the party and serving their constituents (e.g., Republican legislators representing liberal-leaning districts) are rewarded to a larger extent.
Schlagwörter: 
Party discipline
discretionary spending
party line
JEL: 
D72
H41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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