Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162944
Authors: 
Briglauer, Wolfgang
Cambini, Carlo
Grajek, Michał
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 17-028
Abstract: 
In this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper)and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants and test its main predictions using panel data from 27 EU member states over the last decade. Our theoretical model extends the existing literature by, among other things, allowing for heterogeneous entrants in internet access markets, as we consider both other telecom and cable TV operators as entrants. In the empirical part, we use a novel data set including information on physical fiber network investments, legacy network access regulation and recently imposed fiber access regulations. Our main finding is that more stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the fiber networks harm investments by incumbent telecom operators, but, in line with our theoretical model, do not affect cable TV operators.
Subjects: 
Internet access market
Access regulation
Investment
Infrastructure
Next Generation Networks
Broadband
Telecoms
Cable operators and Europe
JEL: 
L96
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
661.04 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.