Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162936
Authors: 
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 2017-03
Abstract: 
We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.
Subjects: 
infinite game of incomplete information
perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium
payoff security
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
240.25 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.