Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162935 
Title: 

Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information

The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s).

Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-02
Publisher: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Abstract: 
The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces and payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and in general not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Another extension of Aumann's [3] solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition.
Subjects: 
infinite games of incomplete information
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
strategic approximation of an infinite game
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: February 6, 2018


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