Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162838 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 260
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the competitive effects of a passive partial ownership (PPO) when it serves as an instrument for the acquirer firm to learn the merger synergies with the target firm in advance. The realization of a synergy is uncertain ex ante, so that a direct merger exhibits a downside risk not only for the merging candidates but also for consumers. We show that minority shareholdings can reduce this downside risk as they allow for a sequential takeover where the acquirer takes an initial minority share, becomes an insider, and learns the merger synergy. We show how this feature of PPOs affects a firm's takeover strategy and the decision problem of the antitrust authority. We derive implications for a merger control approach to PPO acquisitions, where we examine a forward looking price test and a safeharbor rule.
Schlagwörter: 
Merger Control
Passive Partial Ownership
Synergies
JEL: 
L13
L41
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-259-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
598.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.