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Titel: 

Games played through agents in the laboratory: A test of Prat & Rustichini's model

Dokument gelöscht auf Wunsch der Autor:in bzw. der Herausgeber:in.

Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2016-305r
Versionsangabe: 
April 2016 (revised June 2017)
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people ("agents") make decisions that affect payoffs of others ("principals") who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) characterize pure-strategy equilibria of such Games Played Through Agents. Specifically, they predict the equilibrium outcome in pure strategies to be efficient. We test the theory in a series of experimental treatments with human principals and computerized agents. The theory predicts remarkably well which actions, and outcomes are implemented but subjects' transfer offers deviate systematically from equilibrium. We show how quantal response equilibrium accounts for the deviations and test its predictions out of sample. Our results show that quantal response equilibrium is particularly well suited for explaining behavior in such games.
Schlagwörter: 
games played through agents
experiment
quantal response equilibrium
JEL: 
D44
C91
D72
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Dokument gelöscht auf Wunsch der Autor:in bzw. der Herausgeber:in am: 26. September 2019


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