Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162756 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2016-6
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper provides tight necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation with bounded depth of reasoning, discussing the role and implications of different behavioral anchors. The central condition slightly strenghthens standard incentive constraints, and we term it strict-if-responsive Bayesian incentive compatibility (SIRBIC).
Schlagwörter: 
mechanism design
bounded rationality
level k reasoning
revelation principle
incentive compatibility
JEL: 
C72
D70
D78
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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