Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162665 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 19-2017
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm's incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have insufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.
Schlagwörter: 
Innovation
Product Liability
Uncertainty
JEL: 
K13
O31
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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