Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162523 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 17
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and cooperate equilibrium", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" (UPD) against the sender.
Schlagwörter: 
sender-receiver game
commitment
cooperative solution
individual rationality
JEL: 
C72
C65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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