Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162523
Authors: 
Forges, Françoise
Horst, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 17
Abstract: 
We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and cooperate equilibrium", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" (UPD) against the sender.
Subjects: 
sender-receiver game
commitment
cooperative solution
individual rationality
JEL: 
C72
C65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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