Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162514 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 15
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Competing intermediaries search on behalf of consumers among a large number of horizontally differentiated sellers. Consumers either pick the best deal offered by a random intermediary, or compare the intermediaries. A higher number of deal finders has the direct effect of decreasing their search effort, but also increases the incentives for consumers to become informed. A higher share of informed consumers in turns increases the search effort of deal finders, so that the sign of the total effect is ambiguous. If the total effect of lower concentration is to increase search effort, it always decreases the price offered by sellers.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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