Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162514
Authors: 
Foucart, Renaud
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 15
Abstract: 
Competing intermediaries search on behalf of consumers among a large number of horizontally differentiated sellers. Consumers either pick the best deal offered by a random intermediary, or compare the intermediaries. A higher number of deal finders has the direct effect of decreasing their search effort, but also increases the incentives for consumers to become informed. A higher share of informed consumers in turns increases the search effort of deal finders, so that the sign of the total effect is ambiguous. If the total effect of lower concentration is to increase search effort, it always decreases the price offered by sellers.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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