Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162484 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2016-011
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
The aim of this study is to find out why people are telling the truth: is it a desire to respect trust, to avoid losses for others, or a mere distaste for lying per se? To answer this question we study a sender-receiver game where it is possible to delegate the act of lying and where it is possible to take pro-social actions in a subsequent dictator game. We examine how delegation affects the outcomes of people's current and future ethical decisions. We find that a non-trivial fraction of participants delegate their decision. However, delegation is associated with higher transfers in the subsequent dictator game
Schlagwörter: 
sender-receiver games
moral balancing
guilt aversion
JEL: 
C72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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