Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162484
Authors: 
Kandul, Serhiy
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2016-011
Abstract: 
The aim of this study is to find out why people are telling the truth: is it a desire to respect trust, to avoid losses for others, or a mere distaste for lying per se? To answer this question we study a sender-receiver game where it is possible to delegate the act of lying and where it is possible to take pro-social actions in a subsequent dictator game. We examine how delegation affects the outcomes of people's current and future ethical decisions. We find that a non-trivial fraction of participants delegate their decision. However, delegation is associated with higher transfers in the subsequent dictator game
Subjects: 
sender-receiver games
moral balancing
guilt aversion
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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