Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162445 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 243
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r È 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.
Subjects: 
Tullock contest
Nash equilibrium
heterogeneous valuations
discrimination
JEL: 
C72
D72
J71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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