Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162444 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 242
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000, Economics Letters). This is true also when the contest technology reflects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular, the existence of a nontrivial example of a strictly competitive game that is best-response equivalent to a game with identical payoff functions.
Subjects: 
Potential games
Tullock contest
best-response equivalence
zero-sum games
JEL: 
C62
C72
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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